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I. INTRODUCTION
From its rich landscape of beaches and rainforest, to its growth
of coffee and other leading exports, and to its colorful culture portrayed in Carnival celebrations, Brazil appears to be an unstoppable
force in both South America and the global community. However,
due to recent events, Brazil has morphed into a nation crippled by
scandal and political corruption.1 Such corruption has led to Brazil’s
second presidential impeachment in the past 24 years.2 Brazil and
the global community are left with feelings of political insecurity—
unsure if the impeachment of the highest-ranking figure in Brazil is
a secure process that could give way to signs of growth for a nation
that has already undergone numerous political transformations.
Beginning with the Operation Car Wash scandal in March
2014,3 in which dozens of Workers’ Party members were arrested,
Brazilians’ extreme distrust of their own government has led to even
greater political turmoil and economic decline for Brazil.4 On August 31, 2016, Dilma Rousseff, the first female president of Brazil,
was impeached on charges of having violated Brazilian budget
laws.5 Arguably even more controversial, the Brazilian lawmaker
who led the ousting of Rousseff, Eduardo Cunha, has been overwhelmingly voted out of Congress, convicted of corruption and
money laundering, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.6 While
it remains contestable whether Rousseff directly used the budget for
her own personal benefit, it has become increasingly clear that she
1
Vanessa Buschschluter, Dilma Rousseff: Facing A Perfect Storm, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35728133.
2
Marina Lopes & Dom Phillips, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff Ousted
in Impeachment Vote, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazilian-president-dilma-rousseff-faces-final-impeachment-vote/2016/08/30/c85173d4-6ee7-11e6-993f73c693a89820_story.html.
3
Andrew Jacobs & Paula Moura, At the Birthplace of a Graft Scandal, Brazil’s Crisis Is on Full Display, NY TIMES (June 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/11/world/americas/brazil-corruption-dilma-rousseff-operation-car-wash.html.
4
See Lopes & Phillips, supra note 2.
5
Id.
6
See Simon Romero, Brazil’s Congress Expels Lawmaker Who Led Ouster
of President, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09
/13/world/americas/eduardo-cunha-brazil-impeachment-dilmarousseff.html?_r=0.
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may have used budget funds to aid her reelection.7 Rousseff’s former vice president and coalition partner Michel Temer has now replaced Rousseff.8 Within only a few months of taking the presidency, Temer has already found himself in a scandal, as Brazil’s
prosecutor general is investigating claims that he received millions
of dollars in illicit payments and attempted to obstruct an anticorruption drive.9 Thousands of Brazilians have demanded Temer’s
resignation.10 With the recent impeachment of the most powerful
political figure in Brazil, the question remains if Rousseff’s impeachment will turn the once thriving nation around and give it the
opportunity to regain its political balance.
This article will address the impeachment process in Brazil, reviewing relevant laws, constitutional provisions, and historical
background in order to analyze how the impeachment process in
Brazil functions and its impact on Brazilian governance. A comparison will be made between the impeachment process in Brazil and
the impeachment process of the United States, as much of Brazil’s
First Republican Constitution was modeled after the United States
Constitution. Part II of this article will discuss the historical background leading up to the current impeachment in Brazil and will
identify times that Brazil has either impeached or threatened to impeach major political leaders. This section will include a detailed
analysis of major constitutional provisions that affected the nation
and address the political climate in Brazil leading to the impeachment of Rousseff. Part III will analyze the Brazilian Constitution,
7
Joe Leahy, What is Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff accused of? Senators
Declare Their Intention to Impeach Brazil’s President, FINANCIAL TIMES (May,
12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/58401072-167d-11e6-b8d5-4c1fcdbe169f
(“This creative accounting, known as ‘pedaladas’—Portuguese for pedaling—and
roundly condemned by the TCU, the country’s budget watchdog, allegedly helped
her win the 2014 elections by disguising the true state of the economy.”).
8
See Romero, supra note 6.
9
Simon Romero, Brazil’s President Assails His Accuser as Corruption
Scandal Intensifies, NY TIMES (May 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/20/world/americas/michel-temer-brazil.html.
10
Id. (As of August 18, 2017, the President of the House of Deputies, Rodrigo
Maia, has received 26 requests for impeachment of Temer; he has rejected one
and is sitting on the other 25. One of the requests was made by the Brazilian Bar
Association (OAB) on May 25, 2017. The OAB has also brought a writ of security
action in the Supreme Court to try to compel Maia to act on his impeachment
request).
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specifically addressing how the Constitution mandates impeachment processes to be carried out. This section will also discuss all
relevant Brazilian laws regarding the impeachment process, namely
Law No. 1079, enacted in 1950, which, in part, is inconsistent with
the present constitutional impeachment provisions. Part IV will
compare the Brazilian Constitution’s detailing of impeachment to
that of the United States Constitution. Brazil, unlike the United
States, has had eight constitutions, and the present Constitution,
adopted in 1988, has already had 101 amendments. This section will
discuss key differences in how Brazil handles impeachment pursuant to its Constitution and discuss whether voting articles of impeachment has been an effective outlet of halting corruption. Part IV
will analyze modern Brazilian impeachments, specifically Presidents Collor de Mello and Rousseff, as well as modern U.S. impeachments, namely those of Nixon and Clinton. Finally, Part V will
conclude with lessons that can be learned from the Brazilian impeachment process and will discuss whether this process has abated
corruption in a meaningful and lasting way. Part V will additionally
analyze whether the use of Brazil’s impeachment power has produced beneficial results for the nation and what Brazilian impeachment has meant from a global perspective. Part VI will briefly conclude the article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Transitional Period of Military Regime to Democratic Means
From 1964 to 1985, Brazil was governed by an authoritarian
military dictatorship.11 The 1964 military regime in Brazil was fully
supported by the United States in hopes of deterring Brazil from

11

See
Timeline
Brazil,
BBC
NEWS
(Aug.
14,
2012),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1231075.stm; see generally Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985, (Oxford U. Press,
(1988)).
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slipping towards a communist regime.12 Due to widespread opposition to the military regime,13 this period was one of continual constitutional crisis. In response, the government issued a series of 17
Institutional Acts, modifying the 1967 Constitution to suit the military regime.14 These acts were issued by three generals under the
dubious authority that the military regime unilaterally conferred
upon them.15 While the Brazilian people were hopeful that the new
military government would give more power to the citizens, unjust
political maneuvers occurred—the most notable maneuver was Institutional Act 5, which disbanded Congress, suspended habeas corpus for political crimes, and increased overall censorship in Brazil.16
While the military regime is understood as a dark phase in Brazilian
history, marked by censorship and disarray, it was also a motivating
factor for Brazil to return to democratic governance.
From 1974-1985, Brazil entered a political phase of liberalization known as distensão, when the major authoritarian features of
the 1967 Constitution were relaxed by constitutional amendments.17
While the amendments showed signs of Brazil’s turn towards democracy, Brazil’s first civilian president, Tancredo Neves, who died
before taking office, strongly supported adoption of a new Constitution.18 His vice president, José Sarney, proposed a constitutional
amendment that would empower the next Congress to serve as a
constituent assembly.19 However, the amendment was politically
unjust because the next Congress included twenty-three senators
elected under the prior authoritarian regime’s 1982 electoral legislation.20 Thus, the twenty-three senators had no direct voter mandate
to serve as part of the constitutional assembly.21 Before passing the
12

See Pablo Uchoa, Remembering Brazil’s Decades of Military Repression,
BBC NEWS: BBC BRASIL, (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldlatin-america-26713772.
13
See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 774 (1990).
14
Id. at 774.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 775.
18
Id.
19
See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 775 (1990).
20
Id.
21
Id.
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amendment, Congress was not yet aware of the conservative Sarney’s corrupt motives, even while he attempted to sabotage the entire Congressional process up until the very last draft to the Constitution had been created.22
B. Finally, Democracy
Despite the President’s motives to halt the creation of a more
democratic Constitution, the current Constitution was drafted with
the hopes of bringing in a new, democratic government to Brazil.
1985 marked the end of the military regime, as Brazil elected a president through a democratic process. 23 A new Brazilian Constitution
was adopted in 1988 to reflect the nation’s changing political
scheme.24 On November 15, 1989, the entire Brazilian electorate
had its first opportunity in nearly 30 years to vote directly for a presidential candidate, which was an incredible political accomplishment for the nation.25 Under the prior military regime, the right to
vote was restricted to generals.26 The current 1988 Constitution differs drastically from its predecessor to reflect Brazil’s change from
a military government to that of a democracy.27 Consequently, the
Constitution weakened the executive in order to strengthen the legislature.28 The present Constitution states that the House or the Senate, or any of its committees, can require that any Minister of State
appear in person before it to testify or answer interrogatories and
that failure to do so constitutes good cause for impeachment.29 One
of the greatest changes, however, from the 1967 Constitution to the
1988 Constitution was the restoration of law making power to Congress.30 This was a major change from the prior military regime, under which significant legislation was proposed and enacted solely

22

Id. at 777.
Id. at 773. (“The election was held pursuant to Brazil’s Constitution, which
provided the critical framework for restoration of full democracy.”).
24
Id.
25
See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 773 (1990).
26
See id. at 783-84.
27
Id. at 783.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 783-784.
30
Id. at 784.
23
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by Executive Decree.31 Furthermore, the Constitution sought to give
Congress exclusive power to control rule making by administrative
agencies.32 Thus, in theory, all acts of the Executive are made subject to either direct control of Congress, or through control of the
Chamber of Deputies, or the Senate.33 Curiously, however, despite
the number of constitutional provisions decreasing the power of the
Executive, the drafters of the Constitution nevertheless allowed the
Executive to issue provisional measures by decree. The provisional
measures apparently were an oversight, left in when the Constitutional Assembly shifted from a parliamentary system to a presidential system.34 Provisional measures were valid as laws for only thirty
days, but Congress seldom adopted or rejected these provisional
measures within this short period.35 Brazilian presidents reacted by
reissuing provisional measures every month until adopted or rejected by Congress. Such essentially unchecked power created the
potential for corruption—far greater than what can be fathomed in
the United States. Moreover, drafting issues that are blatantly apparent in the current Constitution have arguably led to an even greater
number of corruption scandals than were seen under the military regime.36
III. SUMMARY OF CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS REGARDING
IMPEACHMENT—THE BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION AND LAW NO.
1079 AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION USED TO COMPARE
THE UNITED STATES’ IMPEACHMENT PROCESS TO BRAZIL’S.
In order to understand how the impeachment process functions
in Brazil, it is important to compare carefully the 1988 Brazilian
31

See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773, 784 (1990).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See Brazil Assembly Backs Presidential System, (March 23, 1988), NY
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/23/world/brazil-assembly-backs-presidential-system.html?mcubz=0.
35
Rosenn, supra note 13, at 784.
36
See generally Barbara Geddes & Artur Ribeiro Neto, Institutional Sources
of Corruption in Brazil, in CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL REFORM IN BRAZIL: THE
IMPACT OF COLLOR’S IMPEACHMENT 1, 21-48 (Keith S. Rosenn & Richard
Downes eds., 1999).
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Constitution to that of the United States Constitution. Moreover, I
will be discussing the key, relevant impeachment law that was introduced in Brazil in 1950, Law No. 1079. What will be readily apparent is that Brazil’s reigning law on the issue of corruption and
impeachment is not consistent with the current Brazilian Constitution’s provisions regarding impeachment. This has created a problematic scenario for Brazil.
A. Impeachment Under the United States Constitution
A substantial difference between the United States Constitution
and the Brazilian Constitution is the definition of impeachable offenses.37 Unlike the Brazilian Constitution, which sets out a detailed
list of impeachable offenses, the United States Constitution characterizes impeachable offenses as simply, “Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”38 While the meaning of bribery
and treason is clear, the meaning of the term “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” has remained unclear.39 It has frequently been argued
that an indictable crime is always a prerequisite for impeachment,
but this argument has not been accepted in practice.40 This argument
was most notably discussed in the cases of Justice Samuel Chase,
President Andrew Johnson, and President Richard Nixon.41 In the
United States Congress’s proposal for the impeachment of President
Nixon, the House Judiciary Committee emphatically stated that “a
showing of criminality is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
specification of an impeachable offense.”42
A notable feature of the United States Constitution is that impeachment is a civil and not a criminal proceeding.43 Alexander

37

See Fabio Konder Comparato, The Impeachment Process and the Constitutional Significance of the Collor Affair, in CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL
REFORM IN BRAZIL: THE IMPACT OF COLLOR’S IMPEACHMENT 1, 74-77 (Keith S.
Rosenn & Richard Downes eds., 1999).
38
U.S. CONST., art.II, § 4).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Foundation Press, 2nd ed. 1988).
43
Fábio Konder Comparato, The Impeachment Process and the Constitutional Significance of the Collor Affair, in CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL REFORM
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Hamilton stated, “[impeachment] can never be tied down by such
strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors
or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve
to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security.”44
Impeachment creates no double jeopardy bar to a prior or subsequent criminal prosecution, at least for federal officials other than
the President and Vice President. According to Article I, section III
of the U.S. Constitution, a person convicted of impeachable charges
is subject to indictment, trial, and judgment before the judiciary.45
The provision states, “[j]udgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to
hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
Law.”46
In 1989, Alcee Hastings, a sitting federal judge, was impeached
for the same offense for which he had been acquitted by a jury in a
criminal trial.47 It is not clear, however, whether a sitting president
or vice president can be indicted and tried prior to impeachment.
The issue was raised when former Vice President, Spiro Agnew was
indicted for crimes allegedly committed prior to being sworn in as
Vice President when he was governor of the state of Maryland.48
The issue remained unresolved because Agnew’s lawyers entered
into a plea-bargain in which Agnew agreed to resign in 1973.49 The
issue actually came before the United States Supreme Court in U.S.
v. Nixon, where President Nixon claimed that he could not be constitutionally named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Watergate

IN BRAZIL: THE IMPACT OF COLLOR’S IMPEACHMENT 1, 74 (Keith S. Rosenn &
Richard Downes eds., 1999).
44
Id. at 75. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton)).
45
Comparato, supra note 37, at 75.
46
U.S. CONST, art. I, § 3.
47
David Johnston, Hastings Ousted as Senate Vote Convicts Judge, NY
TIMES (October 21, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/21/us/hastingsousted-as-senate-vote-convicts-judge.html.
48
United States Senate, Spiro T. Agnew, 39th Vice President (1969-1973),
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/VP_Spiro_Agnew.htm.
49
Id.
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Scandal.50 The issue remained unresolved because the Supreme
Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.51
The issue also came up in 1998, when Independent Counsel Kenneth
Star decided to recommend impeachment charges to Congress rather
than seek to indict William Clinton when he was still a sitting President.52 After Clinton’s acquittal by the Senate on charges of obstruction of justice and perjury, both federal criminal offenses, Robert Ray, who replaced Star as Independent Counsel in October 1999,
elected not to seek to indict Clinton until after he left office in January 2001.53 Just before leaving office, Clinton avoided indictment
by reaching an agreement with the Independent Counsel under
which Clinton admitted publically that certain statements made under oath after his relationship with Monica Lewinsky were false and
agreed to surrender his license to practice law for five years.54 The
issue may arise again as special prosecutor Robert Mueller investigates whether there is sufficient evidence to charge President Donald Trump with criminal charges with respect to his role in the current investigation regarding Russia’s interference with the 2016
presidential election and the dismissal of James Comey.55
Furthermore, the United States Constitution lays out the impeachment proceedings quite simply. Under Article II, Section IV
of the Constitution, the text, with the heading “Disqualification”
states, “[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”56 Article I, Section III elaborates on the process, stating:
50

See U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
See id.
52
See A Chronology: Key Moments in the Clinton-Lewinsky Saga, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/resources/lewinsky/timeline/.
53
Neil A. Lewis, Transition In Washington: The President; Exiting Job,
Clinton Accepts Immunity Deal, (Jan. 20, 2011), NY TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/20/us/transition-in-washington-the-president-exiting-jobclinton-accepts-immunity-deal.html?mcubz=0.
54
See id.
55
See Evan Perez, Pamela Brown, & Shimon Prokupecz, One Year into the
FBI’s Russia Investigation, Mueller is on the Trump Money Trail, CNN (Aug. 4,
2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/mueller-investigation-russiatrump-one-year-financial-ties/index.html.
56
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4.
51
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The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall
be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside:
And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. Judgment in Cases of Impeachments shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or
Profit under the United States, but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law.57
This section of the United States Constitution has not been
amended and, as discussed below, contrasts starkly with Brazil’s
1988 Constitution and its detailed law on impeachments. Brazil’s
provisions regarding the impeachment process are much lengthier
and have been amended a number of times to reflect Brazil’s historical transition to democracy throughout the years.
B. Impeachment Under the Brazilian Constitution
Impeachable offenses under the Brazilian Constitution are
known as crimes de responsabilidade, or crimes of responsibility.58
Article 85 of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution states, “[a]cts of the President of the Republic that are attempts against the Federal Constitution are impeachable offenses, especially those against the: existence of the Union; free exercise of the powers of the Legislature,
Judiciary, Public Prosecutor’s Office, and constitutional powers of
the units of the Federation; exercise of political, individual and social rights; internal security of the country; probity in administration; the budget law; and compliance with the laws and court decisions.59 Furthermore, Article 86 states, “[i]f two-thirds of the Cham-

57

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
Comparato, supra note 37, at 75.
59
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 85 (Braz.). (citing
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf).
58
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ber of Deputies accept an accusation against the President of the Republic, he shall be tried before the Supreme Federal Tribunal for
common criminal offenses or before the Federal Senate for impeachable offenses.”60 Brazil’s monarchical Constitution of 1824
did not permit impeachment of the Emperor but did provide for removal of ministers of state for all criminal liability. 61 The Brazilian
Constitution of 1891, the country’s first democratic constitution,
continued the tradition of criminal liability as grounds for impeachment.62 After describing specific instances for presidential impeachment, the Constitution provided that “said crimes shall be defined in
a special law.”63 This feature of the Constitution has been maintained by all subsequent Constitutions.64 Brazil has since enacted
two successive laws defining impeachable offenses, as well as establishing procedural rules for trials of impeachable offenses.65 The
first was Law 30 of 1892, and the second is Law 1079 of 1950,
which is still in force in Brazil.66
The 1988 Constitution expanded the list of impeachable officials
beyond those identified under previous Constitutions in Brazil.67
Previously, the president, vice president, ministers of state, and
judges of the Federal Supreme Court were the only federal officials
who could be impeached.68 The current Constitution added the attorney general of the republic, the federal general counsel, members
of the Superior Courts, members of the Federal Tribunal of Accounts, and the chiefs of permanent diplomatic missions.69
The 1988 Constitution additionally defined who could be tried
by the Senate. Only the president, vice president, members of the
Supreme Court, the attorney general, and the state advocate general

60

CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 86 (Braz.). (citing
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf).
61
Id.
62
Comparato, supra note 37, at 76.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Comparato, supra note 37, at 76.
68
Id.
69
Id.

2017]

IMPEACHMENT IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES

141

are tried before the Senate.70 Ministers of state are tried by the Senate only in cases of impeachable offenses related to such offenses
committed by the president.71 The remaining officials that are listed
within the Constitution are charged and tried before the Brazilian
Supreme Court.72 Under the Brazilian system, an impeached president is suspended from duty pending the outcome of his Senate
trial.73 Article 51(I) states that the Chamber of Deputies has exclusive power by a two-thirds vote to authorize the institution of legal
charges against the President and Vice President, and the Ministers
of the Federal Government.74 Article 52(I) gives the Senate exclusive power to try the President, Vice President, Ministers of the Federal Government, and Commanders of the Navy, Army and the Air
force for impeachable offenses.75
A two- thirds vote of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies is required to bring impeachment charges.76 This differs from the United
States’ proceedings because only a majority vote of the House of
Representatives is needed.77 Following the vote, the Chamber must
then prepare an impeachment report and appoint a committee in
Congress to draft the report discussing whether the charges are
grounded or not.78 The Senate must also create a committee to discuss the charges and eventually vote on if the impeachment should
occur.79 A two-thirds majority vote in the Senate is needed to convict those officials entitled to be tried by the Senate.80 The process
70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Comparato, supra note 37, at 74.
74
Id. at 76. (citing CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 51
(Braz.).
75
Id. (citing CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 52 (Braz.)
(citing Brazil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf).
76
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 51 (Braz.) (citing
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf).
77
U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION art. 52 (Braz.) (citing Brazil’s 1988 Constitution in English translation, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf).
71
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overall is quite convoluted and more complex than what is seen in
the United States.
The 1988 Constitution made important amendments to ensure a
more democratic system and with more tools to use against the executive. For example, the 1988 Constitution was designed to weaken
the executive and to strengthen the legislative and judicial branches
of government.81 Thus, the current Constitution of Brazil ensures
more accountability between the president and Congress, which
aided in the impeachment of Collor de Mello, Brazil’s first democratically elected president after the 1988 Constitution went into
force.82 Additionally either house of Brazil’s Congress, or one of its
committees, can require any executive minister to appear personally
to testify or answer interrogatories.83 If an executive minister fails
to appear without good cause, he may be impeached under the current Constitution.84
Furthermore, one major issue with the impeachment process in
Brazil is that there is considerable discourse regarding the true nature of impeachable offenses and what they fully entail.85 Despite
the explicit language of the 1988 Constitution, one view is that the
Brazilian impeachment proceeding does not encompass crimes but
rather deals with, “political offenses, related to unlawfulness of a
political nature, and politically sanctioned.”86 The other view,
adopted by Brazil’s Supreme Court, is that impeachment is a combination of both political and criminal proceedings.87 Impeachable
offenses may be actual crimes and are thus subject to the fundamental principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege, meaning neither crime nor punishment without law.88 Such crimes, tried before
81

See Keith S. Rosenn, Separation of Powers in Brazil, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 839,
850 (2009).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Comparato, supra note 37, at 74.
86
Id. (citing PAULO BROSSARD, O IMPEACHMENT – ASPECTOS DA
RESPONSABILIDADE POLÍTICA DO PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA note 5, 74 (São
Paulo: Saraiva, 2nd ed. 1992)).
87
Id. (citing PAULO BROSSARD, O IMPEACHMENT – ASPECTOS DA
RESPONSABILIDADE POLÍTICA DO PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA 83 (São Paulo:
Saraiva, 2nd ed. 1992)).
88
Id. at 75.
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a political branch and not before the judiciary, also have a political
sanction.89
Moreover, Brazil has two alternatives to impeachment that are
important to differentiate. First, the Electoral Tribunal can find that
an election was corrupt and can quash the president’s mandate. For
example, on June 9, 2017, Brazil’s top electoral court voted to reject
allegations of campaign finance violations that could have removed
Temer from office.90 Judges voted 4-3 against overturning the 2014
presidential election despite Dilma’s impeachment and Temer’s ballooning corruption scandal and disastrously low popularity among
Brazilians.91 A guilty verdict would have annulled the 2014 election
and stripped Temer of the rest of his mandate.92 Additionally, a
guilty verdict would have stripped both Rousseff and Temer of their
political rights for eight years.93 A second alternative to impeachment is the criminal conviction of a sitting president by the Supreme
Court.94 If two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies approve, a sitting
president can be prosecuted on criminal charges before the Supreme
Court.95 The current Brazilian President, Michel Temer was charged
with corruption by the Prosecutor General, but not even a simple
majority voted to allow the Chamber of Deputies’ prosecution to go
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to trial.96 However, the Prosecutor General recently filed new corruption charges against Temer.97
C. Law No. 1079 (1950)- Crimes of Responsibility
As stated above, Brazil’s current impeachment statute is Law
1079, enacted in 1950.98 Law 1079 differs from the Brazilian Constitution in that it defines impeachable offenses only for the president, vice president, ministers of state, members of the Supreme
Court, and the attorney general of the republic.99 However, Law
1079 was amended by Law 10.028 in 2000, which added Art. 40-A,
sole paragraph, which extends the list of officials subject to impeachment to: The Advocate General of the Union, the Procurator
Generals of Labor, Elections and Military, the Procurator Generals
of the State and the Federal District and to members of the Federal
and State Public Ministries, the Advocacy General of the Union, and
state prosecutors when acting as head of regional or local units of
their agencies.100 Thus, all of these governmental officials can be
impeached using Law 1079, which is inconsistent with the Brazilian
Constitution’s treatment of impeachment.101 Furthermore, even
starker differences are apparent between Law 1079 and the current
Constitution. Law 1079, as well as Decree- Law No. 201, both state
that the crimes being defined in the law, even when simply an attempt, are liable for the penalty of loss of the position with the inability to exercise any public function for at least five years.102 The
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current Brazilian Constitution, however, declares that the impeached official loses his political and civil rights for eight years.103
As stated, Brazil enacted Law No. 10.028, which made various
amendments to the 1950 Impeachment Law.104 For example, Art.
40A was added making crimes of the Procurator-General of the Republic, or of his substitute when acting as head of the Public Ministry of the Union, impeachable offenses under the 1950 Law.105 Because Brazilians have adhered to the law in only finding impeachable offenses for the officials of the president, vice president, ministers of state, members of the Supreme Court, and the attorney general of the republic, it is readily apparent that Law 1079 is given
significant weight, even comparable to the Brazilian Constitution itself.106 In fact, the Collor impeachment was carried out pursuant to
Law 1079, as well as the special rules drafted by the chief justice of
the Supreme Court pursuant to his authority as presiding officer of
the Senate trial.107 Thus, the impeachment provisions under the 1988
Constitution were not the primary source of the rules governing Collor’s impeachment.108 However, Collor was banned from public office for eight years, indicating that in some respects, the current Constitution holds key provisions that the Senate still follows.
The crimes of responsibility set out in Law 1079 include crimes
against the existence of the Union, meaning crimes that threaten the
existence of the Brazilian federal government.109 Such crimes include threats to government intelligence, for example.110 Furthermore, the law includes crimes against the free exercise of constitutional powers; crimes against the exercise of political, individual,
and social rights; crimes against homeland security, crimes against
the administration of justice, crimes against budget laws (a crime
that Rousseff was impeached for), crimes against the safekeeping
103
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and legal employment of public funds, and crimes against the enforcement of judicial decisions.111 While it is apparent that Brazil
has followed, and will likely continue to adhere to, Law 1079 on
matters of impeachment, the statute should be further amended to
align with the 1988 Constitution. It additionally should be noted that
during the Collor affair, the Supreme Court took the liberty of simplifying the impeachment process by modifying or simply choosing
to ignore certain provisions of Law 1079 in order to shorten the procedure.112 Moreover, when the Court did so, Brazil’s Congress was
relieved, as Collor’s impeachment may have easily taken numerous
months to complete, which could have been both politically and economically disastrous for Brazil.113
IV. MODERN IMPEACHMENTS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES.
A. The Impeachment of Collor
Brazilian President Fernando Affonso Collor de Mello served as
President from 1990-1992.114 As Brazil’s first directly elected president since 1960, Collor represented a critical component to Brazil’s
new attempt at democracy.115 Collor was additionally governing under Brazil’s new Constitution and portrayed himself as the president
who would do away with corruption, inefficiency, and a highly inflationary economy.116 While Collor began his presidency with a
triumphant start, he very quickly declined as the leading figure of
Brazil.117 There are several reasons why Collor began to lose favor
among Brazilian citizens. For instance, Collor resorted to a political
111
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device for the clear purpose of bypassing Brazil’s Congress.118 The
device is known as the medida provisória, and is a device that has
been commonly used by Brazilian presidents.119 Brazil’s Constitution permits Presidents to issue decrees with the force of law that
take immediate effect.120 While these provisional decrees were theoretically void ab initio if not adopted by Congress within 30 days,
Collor routinely reissued them until Congress either converted them
into law or rejected them.121 Indeed, the controversial Collor Plan,
which froze virtually all bank deposits for 18 months, was issued
and reissued many times as a provisional decree before Congress
eventually enacted it as law.122 While this power had been a favorite
of the general-presidents of Brazil’s military past (also used liberally
by President Sarney), Collor implemented the device 141 times in
1990 alone.123 Collor’s strategy angered many in Congress and instigated numerous court challenges.124 Eventually, the Supreme
Court declared that reissuing provisional decrees was an unconstitutional procedure but only if they had been specifically rejected by
Congress.125 Finally, in 2001, Congress adopted Constitutional
Amendment No. 32, which prohibited presidents from issuing provisional decrees in many areas, such as nationality, citizenship, political parties and rights, criminal and procedural law, and budgetary
matters.126 To prevent another Collor Plan, Amendment No. 32 also
prohibited any provisional decree from detaining or sequestering
property or any financial assets.127 It also made provisional decrees
valid for 60 days rather than 30 days, a period that could be extended
only once for another 60 days if Congress failed to act.128 This
means provisional decrees normally have a maximum life of 120
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days.129 Moreover, a provisional decree that lapses is no longer void
ab initio; any legal relations constituted under a lapsed decree must
be regulated by legislative decree.130
Another major issue that led to Collor’s eventual impeachment
was his failure to stabilize Brazil’s declining economy.131 Collor’s
drastic economic stabilization plan, which froze bank accounts for
18 months, failed within less than a year, proceeding a major recession accompanied by vast unemployment.132 Similar to the Watergate scandal in the United States, the press played an important
role in Collor’s downfall.133 Because journalists had been censored
during Brazil’s military regime, the media did not hold back in printing stories of both Collor’s unfortunate personality traits (Collor was
known as one of Brazil’s most arrogant presidents) and numerous
scandals, constantly putting Collor on the defensive.134
The primary scandal of Collor’s presidency occurred in May of
1992, when Collor’s brother accused him of operating a corruption
scheme through Collor’s campaign treasurer, Paulo César Farias.135
Following the scandal, thousands took to the streets to protest Collor.136 Only four months later, on September 1, 1992, impeachment
proceedings were initiated.137 The Chamber of Deputies brought impeachment charges against President Collor on two grounds: that he
allowed, “expressly or tacitly, the breach of law and order” and that
he behaved in a way incompatible with the dignity, honor, and decency of the office.138 Collor pled not guilty in the Senate.139 Similar
to the customary plea in United States impeachment cases, Collor
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contended that an indictable common crime was required for impeachment.140 Because a breach of law and order, as well as behavior that is incompatible with dignity, is not technically an indictable
common crime, Collor argued that he could not be impeached.141
Color additionally argued against the vagueness of the legal provisions, contesting that they did not comply with the constitutional requirement of the previous definition of a criminal offense.142 As
stated above, the impeachment of Collor was done through both
Law 1079, the internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies, and by
special rules drafted by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, as he
has special authority as president of the Senate during the impeachment trial.143 However, because the Constitution itself was not the
sole law followed during the impeachment proceeding, legal incongruity persisted.144Although Collor technically resigned in an attempt to prevent his trial of impeachment by the Brazilian Senate,
the Senate voted to continue its impeachment proceedings.145
On December 30, 1992, by the required two-thirds Senate majority, the Senate voted 76-3 to convict Collor on charges of official
misconduct.146 It is clear, based on the mere three votes against his
impeachment, how immensely unpopular Collor was at the time.
Regardless of Collor’s contentions against the proceeding, Collor
was swiftly impeached and succeeded by Vice President Itamar
Franco.147 Collor was later acquitted on ordinary criminal charges
in his trial before Brazil’s Supreme Court, ostensibly due to lack of
valid evidence.148
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B. The Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff
The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff signifies that now half of
Brazil’s elected presidents in its post-1989, democratic era have
been impeached. Similar to Collor’s impeachment, Rousseff’s impeachment was likely not caused by one individual scandal.
Rousseff too was handed a difficult presidency due to Brazil’s immensely struggling economy, leading to anger and outcry from Brazilian citizens. With Brazilians desperately wanting their economy
to return to the days of growth and stability, citizens were demanding a return to substantial economic growth.
In 2014, prosecutors, judges, and federal police began to uncover a multi-billion dollar kickback and bribery scandal at the staterun oil firm Petrobras.149 The kickback scheme, known in English
as Operation Car Wash, began in 2004, but the federal investigation
began in 2014.150 The accusations were brought by federal prosecutors mainly before a state court judge in Paraná, Judge Sergio Moro,
who gained popularity among Brazilians as someone willing to take
on the nation’s most power leaders.151 Petrobras was the largest
Latin American company until the scandal leaked.152 Contracts were
inflated,153 and a portion of the bribes were channeled to the three
Brazilian political parties that had previously formed a ruling coalition.154 The three parties included the Workers Party (Rousseff’s
party), the Democratic Movement Party of Brazil, and the Progressive Party.155 The scheme had grown to include other parties and
Brazilian projects, such as the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam.156
While some felt the scandal was merely a way to end the 13 years
of Worker’s Party rule and to sweep from the government the older
ruling parties, it has become increasingly apparent that funds were
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being inappropriately used to benefit specific political parties, politicians, and government officials or contractors.157 The Petrobras
scandal has had disastrous effects on the Brazilian government.158
Bribes were essential for building coalitions because of the vast
number of political parties within Brazil.159 No single party has ever
been near to a commanding majority in Congress, so support is generally bought with cabinet posts and direct bribes.160 Additionally,
the sheer size of Brazil, as well as the three levels of government
with regular municipal, state, and national elections, have fostered a
corrupt scheme in Brazilian politics.161 The scandal has additionally
been detrimental to business as prosecutors had ordered the suspension of contracts between Petrobras and its primary suppliers, which
unfortunately included nearly all of Brazil’s largest construction and
shipping firms.162 Perhaps even more shocking, in approximately
two years, 61% of Petrobras’ 276,000 employees have lost their
jobs.163 Moreover, numerous smaller firms depended on Petrobras’
business and have consequently become bankrupt due to the scandal.164 Some believe that the scandal could have a positive effect on
Brazil’s government, potentially punishing the corrupt politicians
who were involved and beginning a new era of clean government.165
However, it may be difficult to both pinpoint exactly who was directly involved in the scheme and to give Brazilians any sort of time
frame for bringing to justice all those who may have been involved.166
Prosecutors claim that former President da Silva (or Lula, as
most refer to him) was the primary figure in charge of the scheme,
though he strongly denies violating any law.167 Judge Moro has
since convicted Lula, sentencing him to nine years in jail and seizing
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all of his assets.168 One major issue that divided the nation is whether
and if so, how much, Dilma Rousseff has been involved with the
Petrobras scandal? Currently, prosecutors have not found evidence
that Rousseff was involved in the scheme.169 Even more illuminating, many of Rousseff’s political enemies have conceded that
Rousseff is one of the few politicians in Brazil to not accept
bribes.170 However, it is widely thought that Rousseff must have at
least known what was occurring, as she chaired the board of directors of Petrobras at the peak of the scandal.171 Many in favor of
Rousseff’s impeachment argue that, even if she was merely aware
of the scandal and did not directly participate, she still benefitted
from the illegal campaign funds and did nothing to stop the widescale corruption.172 Moreover, many question Rousseff’s attempt to
appoint Lula to her cabinet, to give him the shield of the privileged
forum.173
One impeachment petition accepted by the Chamber of Deputies
(out of 37 petitions filed) charged Rousseff with criminal activity by
failing to investigate and prevent Operation Car Wash.174 The Procurator General took the position that a sitting president could not be
charged with crimes committed before her presidency, a position
subsequently affirmed by Minister Teori Zauski of the Supreme
Federal Court.175 Therefore, the Chamber of Deputies found only
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the budgetary charges.176 However on September 5, 2017, the Procurator General of Brazil charged Lula and Dilma before the Supreme
Federal Court with a series of crimes including cartel formation, corruption, and money laundering.177
While the Petrobras scandal substantially hurt Rousseff’s public
image, the principal charge brought against her was misappropriating government funds to aid her reelection campaign.178 Rousseff
was accused of misusing government accounts before the last presidential election to make her appear more favorable to Brazilian citizens and create a false visage to aid in her reelection.179 Her critics
charged that Rousseff’s government filled holes in its accounts by
accepting loans from state banks without the approval of Congress.180 Rousseff’s critics contested that this form of pedaladas, or
pedaling scheme, allowed her administration to fund social welfare
programs using funds that were not authorized by Congress.181
Rousseff argued that the money was not being used as a loan because it was merely being transferred through state banks from public coffers.182 Rousseff contested that the impeachment proceedings
were used as a coup d’état against her, as it gave her enemies the
opportunity to remove her from office without waiting for the next
presidential election.183 Additionally, she argued that prior administrations had practiced similar schemes.184
While such scandals should not be taken lightly, many argue that
the alleged corruption was being directly used against Rousseff for

176
Simon Romero, Dilma Rousseff Is Ousted as Brazil’s President in Impeachment Vote, NY TIMES, (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html?mcubz=0.
177
Brazil Former Presidents Lula and Rousseff Charged in Corruption Case,
REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption/brazil-former-presidents-lula-and-rousseff-charged-in-corruption-caseidUSKCN1BH013.
178
Watts, supra note 149.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Brazil impeachment: Key Questions, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016)
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36028117.
184
Id.

154

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:129

the purpose of throwing her out of office. Like Collor, Rousseff became widely unpopular among Brazilians and became the scapegoat
for Brazil’s multiple crises.185 However, also similar to Collor,
Dilma has been viewed as a highly arrogant politician, often too
proud to concede or negotiate and even turning members of her own
party against her.186 Thus, Rousseff’s harsh, stubborn demeanor
aided in the alienation of her own allies and added more fuel to the
fire.
On April 17, 2016, the lower house of Brazil’s Congress voted
in favor of impeaching Rousseff 367 to 137,187 meeting the necessary two-thirds majority to send the charges to the Senate.188 If the
lower house had not reached its two-thirds majority, the impeachment proceedings would have abruptly ended, and Rousseff could
have remained in office.189
On May 12, 2016, the Senate voted on whether to begin the impeachment process.190 The Senate needed only a majority vote.191
By a vote of 55 to 22, the Senate voted to begin impeachment. Consequently, Rousseff was suspended from office.192 Next, the Senate,
on August 9th 2016, voted on whether to proceed with the impeachment Rousseff.193 Once again, a majority vote was needed to pass.194
The Senate passed the vote 59 to 21 and Rousseff was consequently
charged.195 In order to convict, the Senate needed a two-thirds majority to vote for the impeachment.196 On August 31, 2016, the Senate, by a margin of 61 to 20, voted to convict Rousseff, leaving her
185
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center-right Vice President, Michel Temer, a member of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, as Brazil’s new president.197
Curiously, the Senate, with the approval of the President of the
Supreme Federal Tribunal, split its impeachment vote into two: (1)
whether to convict Rousseff; and (2) whether to deprive her of her
political rights for eight years.198 On the second question, the Senate
voted 42 to 36, with three abstentions.199 With the requisite twothirds majority lacking, Rousseff has retained her political rights.200
The division into two votes is contemplated by the sole paragraph
of Article 68 of Law 1079 of 1950, which provides, “if the affirmative answer obtains at least two-thirds of the votes of the senators
present, the President shall re-consult the plenary on the time not
exceeding five years, during which the convicted person shall be
disqualified from performing any public function.”201 On the other
hand, the sole paragraph of Article 52 of the 1988 Constitution provides, “the President of the Supreme Federal Tribunal shall preside,
and a conviction, which may only be rendered by two-thirds vote of
the Federal Senate, shall be limited to the loss of office, with disqualification to hold any public office for a period of eight years,
without prejudice to any other judicial sanctions that may be applicable.”202 Although numerous actions contesting the constitutionality of dividing the Rousseff impeachment with two votes have been
filed with the Supreme Federal Tribunal, no decision has yet been
rendered on the matter.
Temer swiftly named an all-male, all-while cabinet upon gaining
seat to the presidency and is as unpopular, if not more, than Rousseff
197
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herself.203 The attorney general of Brazil has now charged Temer
with receiving money from the massive meatpacking firm JBS,
which itself is already implicated in a corruption scandal.204 The
charges have already been delivered to a Supreme Court judge who
referred the question of whether Temer should be tried by the Supreme Federal Tribunal to the lower house of parliament. 205 A twothirds majority vote is needed to waive Temer’s immunity.206 On
August 2, 2017, the Chamber of Deputies rejected the bid to waive
Temer’s immunity by a vote of 238 against, 198 for.207
Temer has already lost five of his cabinet picks to the Petrobras
scandal, insinuating that a number of his cabinet choices were directly involved in the scandal and may continue to be questioned.208
Time will eventually tell if Temer will develop into the leader that
Brazil so desperately needs; however, with Temer already cloaked
in corruption himself, the future appears bleak for the newly seated
president. While the government did impeach Rousseff in accordance with the Constitution and through democratic means, numerous forms of corruption and instability remain within the Brazilian
government that must be addressed.
C. The Impeachment of Richard Nixon
On July 27, 1974, the United States House Judiciary Committee
recommended that President Nixon, the 37th president of the United
States, be impeached and removed from the office of the presidency.209 Unlike the Brazilian impeachments of Collor and
Rousseff, which were the culmination of scandals and factors that
resulted in an eventual impeachment, Nixon’s fall resulted from a
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single political scandal known as Watergate.210 The scandal first
erupted following a break-in, on June 17, 1972, at the Democratic
Party’s national headquarters in the Watergate apartment-hotel complex in Washington, D.C.211 The group of men who conducted the
break-in were arrested and eventually linked to the White House.212
While Nixon fiercely denied any involvement with the crime, several of his staff members were implicated in an illegal cover-up and
resigned.213 Government investigations revealed a political campaign of dirty tricks by the Committee to Re-elect Nixon, along with
a White House “enemies list.”214 In July 1973, a former Nixon staffmember revealed the existence of privately taped conversations between the president and his aides.215 The government demanded that
Nixon release the tapes; however, Nixon adamantly refused, arguing
executive privilege and national security.216 A federal judge eventually ordered Nixon to turn the tapes over and, after the Supreme
Court affirmed the order, Nixon did so (he did not provide all of the
tapes; however, and on one tape, a portion of conversation seemed
to have been erased).217
On February 6, 1974, the House of Representatives passed
House Resolution 803 by 410-4 to authorize the Judiciary Committee to consider impeachment proceedings against Nixon.218 The text
of Resolution 803 stated,
RESOLVED, That the Committee on the Judiciary
acting as a whole or by any subcommittee thereof appointed by the Chairman for the purposes hereof and
in accordance with the Rules of the Committee, is

210

Joan E. Greve, What Richard Nixon’s Impeachment Looked Like, TIME
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://time.com/3063704/nixon-impeachment/.
211
1974 House begins impeachment of Nixon, HISTORY http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/house-begins-impeachment-of-nixon (last visited
Sep. 23, 2017).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
1974 House begins impeachment of Nixon, supra note 211.
218
Impeachment, WATERGATE INFO, http://watergate.info/impeachment (last
visited Sep. 23, 2017).

158

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:129

authorized and directed to investigate fully and completely whether sufficient grounds exist for the
House of Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America. The committee
shall report to the House of Representatives such resolutions, articles of impeachment, or other recommendations as it deems proper.219
In May 1974, the United States House Judiciary Committee initiated formal impeachment hearings against President Nixon.220 In
July, the first article of impeachment against Nixon, obstruction of
justice, was passed.221 Two additional articles, for abuse of power
and contempt of Congress, were approved on July 29th and 30th.222
Finally, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Nixon must provide transcripts of the missing tapes, as new evidence had clearly
implicated Nixon as being involved in the cover-up.223 However, on
August 8, 1974, Nixon announced his resignation, a remarkable announcement marking the first president in United States history to
leave office voluntarily.224 Thus, while the House had voted to recommend Nixon for impeachment, he resigned before full impeachment proceedings were carried out.225 Unlike Brazil, where the Senate impeached Collor after he resigned, the United States Congress
dropped the impeachment charges against Nixon after his resignation. Nixon was succeeded by Vice President Gerald Ford.226 In a
hotly contested move, Ford decided to pardon Nixon, making it impossible for former President Nixon to be prosecuted for any potential crimes committed while he served as president.227 Moreover, the
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pardon was a major factor in Ford losing his bid for reelection to
President Carter in 1976.228
Nixon’s impeachment proceedings marked a difficult time for
the United States and left citizens with feelings of doubt and mistrust
towards their own president. The scandal additionally cast a dark
cloud over the Republican Party of the United States, as clear corruption and misconduct had taken place. The United States has not
seen the likes of such a massive government cover-up as was seen
in Watergate. The event sent a message to the world that the powerhouse country too had faults and would be willing to use its impeachment power— more than 100 years after the prior presidential
impeachment of Andrew Johnson occurred in 1868.229
D. The Impeachment of Bill Clinton
The impeachment of President Bill Clinton began under odd circumstances and is quite unlike any other scandal that resulted in impeachment in United States history. In 1995, a woman named Monica Lewinsky began an internship in President Clinton’s office.230
Lewinsky and Clinton allegedly became romantically involved even
though Clinton was married.231 Lewinsky eventually left the internship for a paid position within the federal government, and over the
next two years, allegedly had romantic encounters with the president.232 In 1997, a separate sexual harassment allegation against
Clinton arose, brought by a former Arkansas employee named Paula
Jones.233 During the investigation, Lewinsky was subpoenaed and
an alleged secret affair soon turned into a national fiasco.234 While
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Lewinsky denied ever having an affair with Clinton, one of Lewinsky’s coworkers, Linda Tripp, secretly recorded Lewinsky’s comments about her relationship with Clinton.235 In 1998, President
Clinton plainly rejected all allegations, famously stating, “I did not
have sexual relations with that woman.”236 However, Clinton was
later investigated by a grand jury and admitted to inappropriate intimate contact with Lewinsky.237
Special prosecutor Kenneth Starr, who was originally appointed
to investigate the Whitewater Land scandal, submitted a report to
Congress with eleven causes for impeaching President Clinton.238
Among the causes were perjury and abuse of power.239 While this
scandal involved only a consensual affair with another woman, the
report claimed that Clinton’s choices were “inconsistent with the
president’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.”240 On
December 20, 1998, the House of Representatives impeached Clinton on two of Starr’s eleven charges, perjury and obstructing justice.241 Clinton, however, did not resign.242 In January 1999, Clinton
was tried in the Senate, which never reached the two-thirds majority
needed to convict Clinton.243 A vote of 67 was necessary to convict,
but only 45 voted to convict on the perjury charge, while 50 voted
to convict on the obstruction of justice charge. Thus, Clinton was
acquitted of both charges but still offered an apology to the American people.244 Clinton finished his term in January 2001 as the 42nd
President of the United States.245
President Bill Clinton’s impeachment serves an important lesson: a United States president can be impeached under almost any
circumstance. Here, a president was impeached for having an affair
and lying about it. Many were left wondering if impeachment was
an appropriate tool to use under such a circumstance. Was it fair to
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label Clinton as a president who could no longer faithfully execute
the laws simply because he had an extramarital relationship with another woman? No great corruption occurred; no major U.S. secrets
leaked. Did his conduct come anywhere close to “high crimes and
misdemeanors,” or was this really a political vendetta by a partisan
House of Representatives? Great disagreement on the matter is still
widely discussed today in the United States. While some are undoubtedly still angry with the former president for engaging in a
scandalous affair, perhaps many others have quickly forgotten, as
Clinton to this day is known as one of America’s greatest and most
popular presidents.246
V. IMPEACHMENT IN BRAZIL—A TOOL FOR AIDING OR ABETTING
CORRUPTION?
While, provisionally, the United States and Brazil handle the
process of impeachment quite differently, both systems have benefits and weaknesses. As stated above, under the Brazilian Constitution, an impeached president is suspended from the duty of holding
office pending the outcome of his trial.247 In contrast, under the
United States Constitution, an impeached president may continue to
hold office pending the outcome of the Senate trial.248 The framers
of the U.S. Constitution were concerned with other branches of government receiving too much power during the process and thus felt
that the government would be in a more secure position with the
president still in office.249 However, there are clear drawbacks to
having a potentially scandalized and corrupt president continuing to
hold office throughout the impeachment process. Perhaps he would
attempt to swiftly enact a law or executive order that would directly
benefit himself or offer forms of protection. Most notably, the pres-
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ident has the power to disburse public funds and to secure free access to broadcast and television networks.250 Consequently, the president has enormous control over public opinion, able to swiftly shut
off channels of communication among his citizenry.251 While such
a response has not commonly occurred in the United States, it is a
common feature in executive-heavy nations and the world has seen
the danger that can erupt. While the framers of the Constitution of
Brazil tried to ensure that the executive does not have too great
power, the Brazilian President still has vastly greater power than
does the United States President.252 While the United States enforces
its checks and balances in a more democratic manner, Brazil’s impeachment provision suspending an impeached president from office is a safer practice. However, would it have been safer to remove
Clinton from office merely because he engaged in sexual relations
with a mistress? Was he a threat to the other branches of government? Perhaps Brazil has created such a provision because, in such
a strong executive nation, there are greater instances of the executive
acting corruptly or acting to protect himself during the impeachment
process. Additionally, in Brazil, a two-thirds majority of the Chamber of Deputies is needed for the impeachment charges to be
brought, while in the United States, only a majority vote of the
House of Representatives is needed.
In the United States, a president convicted on impeachment
charges is permanently barred from public office. In Brazil, he or
she may not hold office for eight years according to the Constitution,
and for five years according to Law No. 1079.253 It remains unclear
which, if either, is the operative provision in this respect. Interestingly, following Rousseff’s impeachment, the senate also voted to
allow her to maintain her political rights and run for public office.254
In the United States, no impeached president has had to face the
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harsh punishment of losing his ability to run for public office. Nixon
resigned before being tried in the Senate on impeachment charges
and that resignation stopped the impeachment proceedings. Ford’s
pardon stopped any criminal proceedings. The impeachment
against Clinton failed to receive a two-thirds vote in the Senate, and
no criminal charges were brought against him afterwards. Such instances vary starkly from the modern impeachments in Brazil. Both
Collor and Rousseff were impeached and their convictions were
quickly voted by the Brazilian Senate.255 Perhaps Brazil should
adopt the United States’ provision of a permanent ban because if a
president has engaged in substantial instances of corruption, it seems
likely that only five or eight years later, he could be capable of committing corrupt acts once again.
Another key difference between the impeachment process in
Brazil and the United States is the source of law that explains how
the impeachment proceeding will function. In the United States,
only Article II, Section IV of the Constitution very briefly explains
the impeachment process and precisely what is needed to impeach a
president or other high-ranking executive official.256 The process is
further elaborated in Article I, Section III of the Constitution, which
discusses the required two-thirds majority in the Senate in order for
the impeachment to be carried out.257 As seen in the attempted impeachments of Johnson and Clinton, the Senate was unable to reach
the two-thirds majority.
Unlike the United States Constitution, which briefly lays out
what impeachment entails and under what circumstances an individual may be voted in for articles of impeachment, Brazil’s organization of its impeachment proceedings is quite the opposite. As discussed in greater detail above, Brazil has given more weight of au-
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thority to the 1950 Impeachment Law No. 1079. In fact, the law differs in some respects to Brazil’s current Constitution. Until
amended, the law only defined impeachable offenses for the president, vice president, ministers of state, and the procurator general of
the republic.258 Brazil has followed this aspect of the law even when
the Brazilian Constitution said otherwise. Moreover, during the impeachment of Collor, Law No. 1079 was the primary law used to
carry out the impeachment, even over the Constitution.259 While
some would perhaps view this as a major downfall with Brazilians
left perplexed as to which body of law to follow, for the time being,
it is important that Law No. 1079 exists and is actually respected by
Brazilian congressmen and citizens. Because Brazil’s government
has transformed in major ways, as seen in its transition from a military regime to a democratic government, the Constitution has had to
be amended—even totally rewritten more than one hundred times.
Because of the constant amendments and rewrites, Brazilian congressmen and citizens alike do not view their own Constitution as a
Constitution meant to endure for ages to come. While it is important
that, at the very least, Brazilian law-makers adhere to Law No. 1079
and have carried out what the law deems to be a proper impeachment, as seen in Collor and Rousseff’s impeachments, Brazil must
consolidate and simplify its sources of the law to better clarify the
impeachment proceedings. For example, while Law No. 1079 states
that the impeached individual cannot hold public office for five
years, the current Constitution states that the individual loses political rights for eight years.260 Such a provision is critical for Brazil to
clarify in order for Congress to have better understanding of which
is the correct form of punishment for the impeached individual.
Thus, there was likely a large rift between part of the population who
wanted Collor to stay as far away from public office for as long as
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possible (wanting the eight-year loss of rights from the Constitutional provision) and another part of the citizenry wanting Collor to
return to public office and thus hoping for Law No. 1079 to be followed. As previously stated, Collor’s impeachment was governed
by a combination of both the Constitution and Law No. 1079, with
the Senate deciding to halt his ability to run for office for the full
eight years. While both the United States’ and Brazil’s impeachment
provisions have flaws, no political device of such severity is a totally
smooth procedure. What is more important is for both nations to
continue aiming for as great of a democratic process as possible, as
it will reflect the democratic nature of the government to each state’s
citizens and the other nations throughout the world.
VI. CONCLUSION
Impeachment has served as an incredibly important tool in both
the United States and Brazil. It serves as a critical reminder to the
executive that the people will hold him or her accountable for actions that go against the best interests of the nation—corruption, inappropriate usage of the budget, even for instances that go against
society’s morals, as seen in the United States.
What is clear is that Brazil has had to use the device of impeachment frequently since the adoption of the 1988 Constitution, as Brazil has vastly greater work to do to halt its numerous forms of corruption that still exist today. Thus, while impeachment is an important political tool used to abate corruption and hold leaders accountable, it has not halted corruption in Brazil in a meaningful way.
Until Brazil begins to rebuild its failing economy, as well as build
its once booming presence in South America, the people of Brazil
will continue to find reasons, even if they are misplaced, to blame
the president. Such has been the case with the impeachment of
Dilma Rousseff. It is likely that Rousseff was aware that bribes were
being given, yet it is more likely that she was impeached simply due
to the state of the economy and the clear lack of popularity that she
had in her final days as president (arguably also due to her wellknown arrogance and inflexibility as a leader). While Brazil is no
longer under military rule, Brazil must take greater strides to become a true democratic nation. And unlike the United States, the
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Brazilian citizenry simply do not follow and respect the Constitution—it is not viewed as the all-mighty, even holy document as the
United States Constitution is viewed. The same deference is not
given to authority or to the law in Brazil, making it tremendously
difficult for rules to be followed and making corruption a common
occurrence. Unlike the United States Constitution which has had
only 27 amendments in 230 years, Brazil’s current Constitution has
had 102 amendments in 29 years, leaving Brazilians with a sense of
aloofness over their own nation’s Constitution.
While the 1988 Constitution was an important shift in the direction towards democracy, there is still substantial work that must be
done. Brazil’s government must rid itself of corruption and no
longer involve itself in scandals such as Operation Car Wash. Brazil
must create greater checks and balances on the executive branch and
allow the judiciary and legislature to fulfill their responsibilities in
accordance with the Constitution. Brazil must consolidate its countless political parties, thereby eliminating the common act of politicians accepting bribes to forms majorities. Until Brazil takes the
necessary steps towards democracy, impeachment will continue to
be a common tool used against the executive. Thus, it is likely that
more impeachments in Brazil will continue to occur as the Brazilian
citizenry will stay ever vigilant and hold political rulers accountable
for any actions that they find to be a misstep for the once flourishing
nation.

